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Abstract
As any well-taught law student knows, two things must generally
be true in order for an American court to render a binding in personam
judgment against a party who does not reside within the borders of the
state in which the court is located:’ (1) the party’s conduct must fall
within the terms of a statute of that state, universally known as a “long
arm statute,” conferring power upon that state’s courts to hear cases of
the kind described therein, and (2) the assertion of personal jurisdiction
under the long arm statute must satisfy the ”minimum contacts” test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.
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As any well-taught law student knows, two things must generally
be true in order for an American court to render a binding in personam
judgment against a party who does not reside within the borders of the
state in which the court is located:' (1) the party's conduct must fall
within the terms of a statute of that state, universally known as a "long
arm statute," conferring power upon that state's courts to hear cases of
the kind described therein, and (2) the assertion of personal jurisdiction
under the long arm statute must satisfy the "minimum contacts" test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington. Florida attorneys are presently blessed
with a patchwork quilt of long arm statutes, 3 some of which contain
obviously duplicative provisions and each of which is tied, not always
with clarity or reason, to one or another method of service of process on
nonresidents. This collective result of sporadic legislative activity is, at
best, aesthetically displeasing, and, at worst, confusing and productive
of some judicial decisions that seem wholly without a basis in reason.
My primary purposes in writing this article are (1) to explore the interrelationship of Florida's long arm statutes and to recommend amendments which would make them simpler and more sensible, (2) to consider some of the decisions interpreting those statutes, in the light of
the recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 4 and (3) to evaluate the continuing vitality of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Florida in the aftermath of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law; B.A.
1968, Columbia; J.D. 1971, Harvard University.
1. Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1980).

2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 48.011 et seq. & 49.011 et seq. (1979).
4. 444 U.S..286 (1980).
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United States Supreme Court opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner.5

I.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME

Florida's "general" (i.e., most comprehensive) long arm statute, §
48.193,6 was enacted in 1973. Most significantly, it asserts the jurisdic-

5. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
6. 48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in
this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the
following:
(a) Operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in this state or has an office or agency in this state.
(b) Commits a tortious act within this state.
(c) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property within this state.
(d) Contracts to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting.
(e) With respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or
with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding
the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time
or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for
filing an action for dissolution of marriage.
(f) Causes injury to persons or property within this state arising
out of an act or omission outside of this state by the defendant, provided that at the time of the injury either:
1. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities
within this state which resulted in such injury; or
2. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this
state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use, and the use or
consumption resulted in the injury,
(g) Breaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as provided in this section may be
made by personally serving the process upon the defendant outside this
state, as provided in § 48.194. The service shall have the same effect as
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tion of the Florida courts over any "person" who commits a tortious act
within Florida, 7 causes injury in Florida resulting from an act or omission outside the state (provided that certain other facts are true),8
breaches a contract in Florida by failing to perform acts required by
the contract to be performed in Florida,9 or engages in a "business or
business venture in this state or has an office or agency in this state." 10
In any of such cases, the statute provides for jurisdiction only with respect to a cause of action "arising from" one of the enumerated activities." The statute is typical and essentially unobjectionable. But when
the Florida legislature enacted § 48.193, it did not repeal any of five
pre-existing statutes which are arguably unnecessary in light of §
48.193.
Section 48.17112 provides for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident motor vehicle owner or operator with respect to civil actions arising out of any accident or collision occurring within the State of Florida in which the motor vehicle is involved. Section 48.19"s makes
similar provision with respect to operators of aircraft or watercraft in
if it had been personally served within this state.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts or omissions enumerated in this section may be asserted against a defendant in an action in
which jurisdiction over him is based upon this section, unless the defendant in his pleadings demands affirmative relief on other causes of action, in which event the plaintiff may assert any cause of action against
the defendant, regardless of its basis, by amended pleadings pursuant to
the rules of civil procedure.
(4) Nothing contained in this section shall limit or affect the right
to serve any process in any other manner now or hereinafter provided
by law.
FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1979).
7. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(b) (1979).
FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(f) (1979).
9. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(g) (1979).
10. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a) (1979). Very few decisions have construed the
other subsections of § 48.193. With respect to § 48.193(1)(d), see Atlantic Lines, Ltd.
v. M/V Domburgn, 473 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Fla. 1979). With respect to §
48.193(1)(e), see Estanislao v. State of Florida Dep't of HRS, 368 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1979).

8.

11.
12.
13.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
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the state. These statutes obviously make primary reference to conduct
which is encompassed by § 48.193 (1)(b), which confers jurisdiction
over one who "[c]ommits a tortious act within the state." A few Florida cases have held § 48.171 applicable to contract disputes arising out
of automobile accidents in the state, 14 but such cases should easily fall
within the coverage of § 48.193(1)(g). Both § 48.171 and § 48.19 expressly include cases of vicarious liability by nonresidents, but so does §
48.193(1), although admittedly not in the same words; it is therefore
possible that the statutes do not completely overlap. 5 Another situation
to which § 48.171, but not § 48.193, might apply, although apparently
there is no reported decision of this kind in Florida, is an action against
a nonresident motorist based upon his allegedly negligent omission,
outside of Florida, to repair his vehicle prior to driving it into this state;
such conduct might well fail to satisfy the terms of either §
48.193(1)(b) or (f). Still, the typical cases under § 48.171 and § 48.19
are now covered by § 48.193.
Another pre-1973 long arm statute which has survived is §
48.181.116 This was by far the most useful and most frequently utilized
14. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 264 So. 2d
842 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Marion County Hospital Dist. v. Namer, 225 So.
2d 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Miller, 172 So.
2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
15. Section 48.171 confers jurisdiction over one who permits a motor vehicle
owned by him to be driven in the State of Florida. Young v. Young, 382 So. 2d 355
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Section 48.193(1) confers jurisdiction over one who
"personally or through an agent" does any of the acts enumerated in the statute. The
mere fact that the owner of a vehicle has given the driver his permission may not
suffice to render the driver the "agent" of the owner, within the meaning of §
48.193(1), although it has generally been held that the owner of an automobile is liable
for the negligence of one driving with his consent. E.g., Skroh v. Newby, 237 So. 2d
548 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Slitkin v. Avis Rent-a-Car Syss., Inc., 382 So. 2d
883 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Langstron v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 993
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
16. 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state
(1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign
corporations, and any person who is a resident of the state and who
subsequently becomes a nonresident of the state or conceals his whereabouts, of the privilege extended by law to nonresidents and others to
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statute prior to the enactment of § 48.193, and it continues to be utilized today. It provides for personal jurisdiction over any nonresident
legal entity who accepts "the privilege extended by law.
to operate,
conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in the
state, or to have an office or agency in the state" with respect to any
civil action "arising out of any transaction or operation connected with
or incidental to the business or business venture."1 7 Aside from the
grammatical reconstruction of the sentence, the language in §
48.193(l)(a) is identical, and indeed Florida courts have held that the
language of § 48.193(1)(a) means exactly the same thing as the language of § 48.181(l).18 Again, however, there is at least one potential
difference between the statutes. Section 48.181(3), added in 1957, provides that any person who sells or leases property through "brokers,
jobbers, wholesalers or distributors" to anyone in Florida "shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying
on a business venture in this state." To my knowledge, no reported decision has yet considered the question of whether the principle exoperate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture
in the state, or to have an office or agency in the state, constitutes an
appointment by the persons and foreign corporations of the secretary of
state of the state as their agent on whom all process in any action or
proceeding against them, or any of them, arising out of any transaction
or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business
venture may be served. The acceptance of the privilege is signification
of the agreement of the persons and foreign corporations that the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if served
personally on the persons or foreign corporations.
(2) If a foreign corporation has a resident agent or officer in the
state, process shall be served on the resident agent or officer.
(3) Any person, firm or corporation which sells, consigns, or leases
by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property,
through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person, firm
or corporation in this state shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this
state.
FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1979).
17. FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (1979).
18. Bank of Wessington v. Winters Gov't Sec. Corp., 361 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Escambia Treating Co. v. Otto Candies, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1235
(N.D. Fla. 1975).
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pressed in § 48.181(3) is also applicable, by implication, under §
48.193(1)(a); possibly it is not, and possibly that could lead to different
results under the two statutes, but certainly it would be simple enough
to add the language of § 48.181(3) to § 48.193(1)(a).
The most important distinction, however, between § 48.193, on the
one hand, and § 48.181, § 48.171, and § 48.19, on the other, concerns
the methods of service of process authorized by these statutes. Section
48.193(2) states that service upon anyone who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts under § 48.193 "may be made by personally
serving the process upon the defendent outside this state, as provided in
§ 48.194." Regrettably, the Florida courts have, with virtual unanimity, interpreted this section to mean that nonresidents sued in Florida
under § 48.193 must be personally served outside the state in the manner described in § 48.194.19 This conclusion has led to absurd results,

as, for example, where service of process upon a Panamanian corporate
defendant was held invalid, in a suit in which jurisdiction was based
upon § 48.193(1)(g), because service was made upon the corporation's
president at his home in Dade County. 0
According to the three older statutes, in contrast, the defendant's
relevant activity in the state constitutes an appointment of the Florida
Secretary of State as his agent for service of process. One must then
look to § 48.161,1 which prescribes the method of service upon the
Secretary of State and requires that a copy of the process be mailed or
delivered to the nonresident defendant as well. From the face of the
statutes it would appear that § 48.161 represents the exclusive method
for service in cases in which personal jurisdiction is predicated on §
48.171 or § 48.19. Section 48.181(2) provides a preferred alternative
method in "business or business venture" cases: if a foreign corporation

19. Underwood v. University of Ky., 390 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Tucker v. Dianne Elec., Inc., 389 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
A.B.L. Realty Corp. v. Cohl, 384 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Bradford
White Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 372 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); P.S.R.
Assocs. v. Artcraft-Heath, 364 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); but see Rosen
v. Rosen, 306 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (dictum); Poston v. American
President Lines, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (no discussion of this issue).
20. Caribe & Panama, Invs. S.A. v. Christensen, 375 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (J. Pearson, dissenting).
21. FLA. STAT. § 48.161 (1979).
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engaging in such activity in Florida has a "resident agent or officer" in
the state, process "shall" be served on him or her. The Florida courts
appear to have held that a foreign corporation amenable to suit in Florida under § 48.181 may be served, if feasible, according to § 48.081(1)
and (2),22 which list the corporate officers and agents upon whom process may be served.23
What all this means is that, even within the substantially overlapping coverage of § 48.193, on the one hand, and §§ 48.171, 48.181, and
48.19, on the other, the statutes are not duplicative because they are
tied to different methods of service of process. I submit that this is a
senseless state of affairs, and the product of historical accident rather
than design. There is no good reason'why methods of service of process
available in one category of cases should differ from those available in
another category. The sensible thing to do would be to list all of the
methods of service upon nonresidents deemed constitutionally acceptable, and provide that any of them may be utilized in conjunction with
any long arm statute. Among the methods so listed should be personal
service inside or outside the State of Florida, and service by registered
or certified mail addressed to persons outside the state.24 Substituted
service upon the secretary of state is a vestige of long-discredited doctrine that should be scrapped. It arose as a feature of the early "im22. FLA. STAT. § 48.081(1) & (2) (1979). See also FLA. STAT. § 48.081(3),
providing the further alternative of service upon the registered agent required by section 48.091 in the case of Florida corporations and foreign corporations qualifying to
do business in Florida.
23. At least a few courts have held that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation is not effectuated merely by satisfaction of § 48.081(1); they have stated
that § 48.181 must be satisfied as well. Caribe & Panama, Invs. S.A. v. Christensen,
375 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Goffer v. Weston, 217 So. 2d 896 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see also Heritage Corp. of S. Fla. v. Apartment Invs., Inc.,
285 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The strong implication is that the methods of service provided by § 48.08 1(1) and (2) may be utilized in cases in which jurisdiction is conferred by § 48.181.
24. Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895 (M.D. Fla. 1972), offers another example
of an undesirable result compelled by the present statutory scheme. The federal district
court, obliged to follow Florida law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e),
quashed service on a Florida resident who received substituted service in North Carolina under §§ 48.161 and 48.181. The court stated that those statutes did not apply
because the defendant was neither a nonresident nor concealing himself.
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plied consent" statutes25 designed to circumvent the proscription declared in Pennoyer v. NefflO against service of process beyond the
boundaries of the state. The United States Supreme Court stated over
thirty years ago that what matters, as a matter of constitutional due
process, is that the notice given to a defendant be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action . .

"

Obviously the meaningful part of §

48.161 is the provision for the mailing of process to the defendant, and
not the delivery of papers to a public official; even when the defendant's
whereabouts are unknown, constructive service by publication is more
likely to give him notice than substituted service upon the secretary of
state.
Once having eliminated the needless differences in the long arm
statutes with respect to service of process, the Florida legislature should
decide whether any substantive considerations justify the retention of
§§ 48.171, 48.181, or 48.19. Two other long arm statutes should be
reconsidered as well. One is § 48.071,28 providing for jurisdiction over a
nonresident individual or partnership which "engages in business" in
Florida, with respect to civil actions "arising out of such business." The
statute provides for service on "the person who is in charge" of such
business, with a copy to be sent by registered or certified mail to the
nonresident defendant. If the methods of service of process are harmonized, the overlap with § 48.193(1)(a) appears to be total. If the number of reported decisions are any indication, moreover, this statute has
received remarkably little use.
The other statute whose utility should be reconsidered is §
48.081 (5),29 which confers jurisdiction over a corporation which "has a
25.

See, e.g., the Massachusetts statute upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352

(1927).
26.
27.

95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

28.

FLA. STAT.

29.

48.081 Service on corporations

§ 48.071 (1979).

(5) Where a corporation has a business office within the state and is actually
engaged in the transaction of business therefrom, service upon any officer or business agent, resident in the state, may personally be made, pursuant to this sec-

tion, and it is not necessary in such case, that the action, suit or proceeding
against the corporation shall have arisen out of any transaction or operation con-
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business office within the state and is actually engaged in the transaction of business therefrom"; service may be made upon "any officer or
business agent, resident in the state." Paragraph 48.193(1)(a) is potentially more far-reaching than this statute in that it refers to a party
who "has an office or agency in this state." But there is one crucial
difference between § 48.193 and § 48.081(5) that gives the latter statute greater scope: § 48.193(1), again, extends jurisdiction only to
causes of action arising from the Florida activities listed in the statute;
§ 48.081(5), uniquely among the Florida long arm statutes, states that
a civil action against a corporation covered by that section need not
have arisen out of the corporation's business transacted within the
State of Florida.
Is such a legislative pronouncement constitutional? The Florida
courts seem to have acted somewhat schizophrenically with respect to
that question. When long arm statutes have required that the cause of
action have arisen from the defendant's relevant Florida activities, the
courts have naturally insisted upon compliance with such statutes,30 but
often they have gone on to suggest that such a statutory requirement
was constitutionally compelled." When long arm statutes have not required such a connection, however, no Florida court has yet suggested
that a serious constitutional problem was presented. Thus, the few reported Florida decisions applying § 48.081(5) have done so without difficulty (and without any discussion of due process or "minimum contacts"), despite the fact that the cause of action was clearly
nected with or incidental to the business being transacted within the state.
FLA. STAT.

§ 48.081 (1979).

30. E.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Jamison, 353 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Youngblood v. Citrus Assoc. of the N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
31. "In addition, in order to meet constitutional standards, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident must be limited to causes of action arising out of
and directly related to the acts of the nonresident by which he 'purposefully avail[s]
...[himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the state.'" Corley v.
Miliken, 389 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 1980) (applying § 48.19). Similar statements were
made in Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Simari, 191 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1966); Giannini Cont.
Corp. v. Eubanks, 190 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1966); Manus v. Manus, 193 So. 2d 236 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966); but see H. Bell & Assocs. Inc. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co.,
140 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Hoffman v. Air India, 393 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1968); Woodham v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 390 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1968).
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1

unconnected to the defendant's Florida contacts. 2
The Supreme Court of Florida confronted the issue in a related
context in Confederation of Canada Life Insurance Co. v. Vega y
Arminim3s back in 1962. The plaintiff sued a Canadian insurer for the
cash surrender value of an insurance policy purchased by the plaintiff
in Cuba in 1928; the transaction had nothing to do with Florida. The
defendant had qualified to do business in Florida, and thus personal
jurisdiction was upheld under § 624.0221, providing that an insurer
who applies for authority to transact business in Florida "shall file...
its appointment of the [insurance] commissioner

. . .

as its attorney to

receive service of all legal process issued against it in any civil action
....

." In response to the insurer's argument that due process was vio-

lated by applying the statute to a case in which the cause of action was
unconnected to the defendant's Florida activities, the court made a firm
distinction between corporations which had qualified to do business in
Florida and those which had not:
The statute and cases pertaining to service of process upon an actual representative or an impliedly appointed agent of a foreign
corporation not authorized to do business within the state wherein
the suit is brought are not applicable to the instant issue. The issue
before us is restricted to those cases wherein the foreign corporation, as a condition precedent to its operations within the state, has
expressly designated a public official as its agent for the purpose of
receiving service of process.
[T]he decided weight of authority is to the effect such a foreign
corporation qualifying to do business in the state becomes amenable to process even as to causes of action not arising out of its
transactions therein and thereby suffers no denial of due process of
law.'
At least one lower Florida appellate court has reached the same
conclusion with respect to the statutory provision allowing service to be
32.

Killingsworth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 327 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.

App. 1976); Crown Colony Club, Ltd. v. Honecker, 307 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974); see also Donnelly v. Kellogg Co., 293 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
33. 144 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1962).

34. 144 So. 2d at 808 (emphasis in original). Accord, Kephart v. Pickens, 271
So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (applying §§ 624.422-23); Crown Life Ins.
Co. v. Luzanaga Y Garay, 141 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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made upon the registered agent of a foreign corporation qualified to
transact business in Florida.3 5 The Florida Corporation Code3s requires
foreign corporations doing non-exempted intrastate business in Florida
to "qualify" as such, in order to be able to do so without penalty;37 one
requirement for qualification is the appointment of a registered agent
for service of process.38 Sub-section 48.081(3) provides that process
may indeed be served upon such an agent. Need the plaintiff's cause of
action in such a case have arisen out of the foreign corporation's activities in Florida in order to satisfy the demands of due process? A Florida district court of appeal answered this question in the negative. The
court stated that the question of minimum contacts had not been raised
in the action, but added:
We believe, however, that such minimum contacts would seem patently
established where, as here, the foreign corporation has actually qualified
under Florida law to transact business in this state and has appointed a
resident agent for service of process as required by.

.

. 48.091, F.S.A.3 9

The Florida courts appear to have taken too simplistic a view, in
different ways at different times, of the "requirement" that the cause of
action have arisen from the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
The only requirement - but a constant one - is "minimum contacts." A

connection between the plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's
activities in the state is, in effect, one more contact between the defendant and the forum state; it is fairer and more reasonable, in such circumstances, to require the defendant to defend in the courts of the forum state. In the absence of such a connection, "minimum contacts"
may still exist, but only if the defendant's contacts with the state are
greater, in quantity and/or quality, than would be necessary if the connection existed. The United States Supreme Court appears to have endorsed this point of view, although admittedly in dictum, in the Inter35. Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortgage Co., 240 So. 2d 879 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970). See also Killingsworth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 327 So.
2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
36. FLA. STAT. §§ 607 et seq. (1979).
37. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.034 et seq. (1979).
38. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.324 & 48.091(1) (1979).
39. 240 So. 2d at 882.
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national Shoe case, in which Chief Justice Stone wrote:
"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the
activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on .

. .

. Conversely it

has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate
agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a
state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on
causes of action unconnected with the activities there.
[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as
to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely
40
distinct from those activites.
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,4 on which the Florida
Supreme Court relied in the Confederationcase, is not to the contrary.
There the United States Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the Ohio
courts to assert jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation with respect
to a cause of action that had arisen outside of Ohio. The Supreme
Court stated that Ohio could constitutionally have asserted jurisdiction
in such a case, but it must be noted that the Court characterized the
'
activities of the defendant in Ohio as "continuous and systematic."42
To say, then, that a connection between plaintiff's cause of action
and defendant's activities in the forum state is, with respect to a given
category of cases, either always required or never required, is too simplistic. Moreover, as at least one federal court has recognized, 43 it is
40. 326 U.S. at 317-18 (citations omitted). Accord, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 413 (9th Cir. 1977).
41. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
42. Id. at 448.
43. Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 404 U.S. 948 (1972) (citations omitted):
We think the application to do business and the appointment of an agent for
service to fulfill a state law requirement is of no special weight in the present
context. Applying for the privilege of doing business is one thing, but the actual
exercise of that privilege is quite another . - . . The prinicples of due process

require a firmer foundation than mere compliance with state domestication
statutes.
A sentence from the Supreme Court opinion in Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co. is
also worth quoting: "The corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under
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unrealistic to view a case any differently simply because state law compels the written appointment of a state official as one's agent for service
of process in order to transact business in that state. To my knowledge,
the Florida appellate courts have given no evidence of a proper understanding of this aspect of the "minimum contacts" analysis, with the
consequence that the few cases decided under § 48.081(5) have
reached very questionable results. 44 Properly applied, however, that section reaches further than § 48.193(1)(a), and thus serves a useful
purpose.

II. THE CASE LAW
A.

Products Liability Cases Under § 48.193

The United States Supreme Court stated, in InternationalShoe,
that "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' -45 The somewhat amorphous concept of "minimum contacts" remains the test for personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, its case-by-case application properly and ultimately
guided by considerations of basic fairness. The United States Supreme
Court has had several occasions to apply this test in the years since
InternationalShoe, and it has done so with uncharacteristic consistency; 46 the one theme that pervades all of its opinions in this area,

state statute, make it necessary for it to secure a license and to designate a statutory
agent upon whom process may be served provide a helpful but not a conclusive test."
342 U.S. at 445.
44. See Killingsworth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 327 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); Crown Colony Club, Ltd. v. Honecker, 307 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1974); see also Donnelly Co., 293 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
45. 326 U.S. at 316.
46. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); see Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal.
436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins., Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). An unexplained departure from the general pattern is the decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 49 U.S. Law Week 4445 (April 28,
1981), involving an action brought in a federal court in Illinois seeking to enjoin the
flow of inadequately treated sewage from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, into Lake Michigan
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culminating in the World-Wide Volkswagen47 decision of 1980, is the
concept of "purposeful activity."
Chief Justice Warren expressed it this
48
way in Hanson v. Denckla:

The application of the [minimum contacts] rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within 49the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.

Florida courts have clearly shown that they understand this requirement. Thus, for example, in Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough,50 it was held that a Florida court lacked jurisdiction over a
North Carolina automobile dealer whose alleged negligence in repairing a car in North Carolina gave rise to an accident in Florida; the
language of § 48.193(1)(1)(2) seemed to apply, the court found, but
the North Carolina third-party defendant had engaged in no purposeful
activity vis-a-vis the State of Florida. Similarly, according to Osborn v.
and ultimately into Illinois waters. Although the suggestion of "purposeful activity" in
Illinois seems a bit strained in this context, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-

cuit concluded simply that it was not "unfair or unreasonable" to extend jurisdiction
over the City of Milwaukee in Illinois. 599 F.2d 151, 156 (7th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court agreed, with Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, addressing the issue in a
footnote: "We agree that, given the existence of a federal common law claim at the
commencement of the suit,. . . personal jurisdiction was properly exercised.

.

. ."

49

U.S. Law Week at 4447 n.5. See also Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S.
493, 500 (1971).
47.

-

U.S.

-,

100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).

48. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
49. Id. at 253.
50. 352 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977). See also Harlo Prods. Corp. v.
J. I. Case Co., 360 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Hyco Mfg. Co. v. Rotex
Int'l Corp., 355 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Dunn v. Upjohn Co., 350 So.
2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); but see Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of the
N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The court in
Pickard also rejected the view, expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., Ltd., 543 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir.
1976), that the mere fact that an injury (caused by a tortious act) occurs in Florida is
sufficient to invoke § 48.193(1)(b). But see Lee B. Stern & Co., Ltd. v. Green, 398
So.2d 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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University Society, Inc.,51 Florida had no jurisdiction over a New York
defendant in an action seeking payment for services rendered by the
Florida plaintiff in New York, despite the literal application of §
48.193(1)(g), where there was no indication that the nonresident defendant had engaged in purposeful activity in Florida.52
One of the most interesting contexts in which the "purposeful activity" requirement has been applied is the products liability case.
When is it fair for a court to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident
manufacturer of seller who has directly or indirectly sent one or more
of its products into the forum state? Consider two archetypal and leading cases of the 1960s that considered this question. The famous Illinois case of Gray v. American Radiator & StandardSanitary Corp.53
concerned an action by an Illinois resident arising out of the explosion
of a water heater in Illinois; she sued the Pennsylvania corporation
which had manufactured the water heater and the Ohio corporation
(Titan) which had manufactured a safety valve, incorporated into the
water heater, which was allegedly defective. Although the opinion of
the Supreme Court of Illinois reveals no clear evidence of Titan's intent
to send its products into Illinois or knowledge that its products would
find their way into Illinois, the court made the following statements in
upholding personal jurisdiction over Titan in Illinois:
Where the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from the manufacture
of products presumably sold in comtemplation of use here, it should not
matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or
that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into this
State....

51. 378 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
52. A few Florida courts have held that § 48.193(1)(g) applies simply by virtue
of the fact that payment by the defendant is due in Florida, and that this is true when
the plaintiff resides in Florida even though the contract is silent on the point. Professional Patient Transp. Inc. v. Fink, 365 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Madox Int'l Corp. v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Servs., Inc., 342 So. 2d 1082
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of Kissimmee v. Dunham, 342 So. 2d
1021 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Those holdings are properly modified by the concern for minimum contacts reflected in Osborn and Lakewood Pipe of Tex., Inc. v.
Rubaii, 379 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); but see Guritz v. American
Motivate, Inc., 386 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
53. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products
for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable
there for any damage caused by defects in those products."

Compare Gray with the opinion of the Supreme Court of California in
Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County.55 In
Buckeye a California resident sued the Ohio manufacturer (Buckeye)
of a pressure tank which exploded in California. Buckeye's contacts
with the State of California were not extensive, and no one seemed able
to explain how the particular pressure tank which had injured the
plaintiff had come to rest in California. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court of California held that Buckeye was amenable to suit in California, and made the following key pronouncements while doing so:
If the manufacturer sells its products in circumstances such that it
knows or should reasonably anticipatethat they will ultimately be resold
in a particular state, it should be held to have purposefully availed itself
of the market for its products in that state.
Buckeye did not allege before the trial court that the tank which
allegedly injured plaintiff arrived in California in a manner so fortuitous
and unforeseeable as to demonstrate that its placement here was not
purposeful.56
The difference in the theories suggested by the language of the Illinois
and California courts is evident. Gray, although *somewhat unclearly,
suggests that the purposeful activity requirement can be satisfied by the
intentional sale of one's products for ultimate use in other states, with
at least a subjective "contemplation" of such use in the forum state.
Buckeye goes further, suggesting rather clearly that the mere objective
foreseeability of the product's entry into the forum state will suffice.
57
In World-Wide Volkswagen the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
took a position reminiscent of the Buckeye approach to the minimum
contacts test, but without explicitly saying so. The plaintiffs in the case,
who had been injured in an automobile accident in Oklahoma, sued the
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at
, 176 N.E.2d at 766 (emphasis supplied).
71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
Id. at -, -, 458 P.2d at 64, 67 (emphasis supplied).
585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
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manufacturer of their automobile as well as the regional distributor
and dealer who had sold them the automobile in New York, alleging
defective design and placement of the gas tank and fuel system. The
regional distributor and the New York dealer contested the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over them in Oklahoma, but without initial success. Oddly, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is devoted
entirely to the question of whether the Oklahoma long arm statute applied to these facts; at no point did that court expressly address itself to
the question of minimum contacts. Nonetheless, the court did make the
following statement en route to its conclusion that the defendants could
be sued in Oklahoma: "In the case before us, the product being sold
and distributed by the petitioners is by its very design and purpose so
mobile that petitioners can foresee its possible use in Oklahoma." 58
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 59 In the process of
doing so, it seems to have eliminated the possibility of equating the
mere objective "foreseeability" of a product's entry into a state with
the requisite "purposeful activity" on, the part of the nonresident. Justice White, writing for a six-man majority of the Court, observed that
the defendants carried on "no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma." 60
Conceding that it was foreseeable that the purchasers of automobiles
sold by the defendants might take them to Oklahoma, he stated: "Yet
'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for per' If it were, he consonal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause."61
tinued, "[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his
agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with
the chattel." 62 Justice White added:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather,
it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 354.
U.S. ___, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
Id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 566.
Id.
Id.
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The forum state does not exceed its powers under the Due Process clause
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State. Compare Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp..... Is
The citation of Gray is somewhat cryptic. Whether the Supreme
Court approves of Gray's language and result is impossible to say; the
opinion in Gray does not disclose whether the plaintiff purchased the
water heater in Illinois, nor did the Supreme Court of Illinois insist
that the defendant must have had an expectation that such a sale
would occur. What is important is that a majority of the United States
Supreme Court has suggested, albeit in dictum, that the intentional
sale of one's products in the forum state, directly or indirectly, may
serve as a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the seller.
The Supreme Court reinforced that suggestion when it dismissed,
for lack of jurisdiction, an appeal from the 1979 ruling of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc." The plaintiff in that
case sued the Belgian manufacturer of plaintiff's tires, the failure of
one of which had allegedly caused injury to the plaintiff. The tire was
manufactured in Belgium, then sold there to General Motors, which
installed it on an automobile which was shipped to Illinois and sold
there to the plaintiff's father. Discovery revealed that numerous such
tires manufactured by the defendant had been similarly shipped to Illinois during a relevant time period; the defendant apparently had no
other contacts with Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
courts of Illinois had jurisdiction over the Belgian manufacturer. The
63. Id. at 567. Mr Justice White's highly quotable reference to a "critical" foreseeability standard is misleading (and therefore regrettable) in that it appears to provide a test for jurisdiction but in actuality does not do so. As one commentator has
noted, "jurisdictional foreseeability is a conclusion that implies advance litigant perception of relevant grounds for jurisdiction. The foreseeability concept itself cannot provide those grounds." Ratnep, ProceduralDue Process and Jurisdiction to Adjudicate,
75 N.W. L. REv. 363, 379 (1980). See generally Ripple & Murphy, Worldwide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson: Reflections on the Road Ahead, 56 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 65 (1980).
64. 75 Ill. 2d 393, 389 N.E.2d 155 (1979), appeal dismissed, - U.S.
, 100
S. Ct. 992 (1980).
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only real explanation given was as follows:
Defendant Englebert's tires, introduced into the stream of commerce in
obvious contemplation of their ultimate sale or use in other nations or

States, came into Illinois on a regular basis and in substantial numbers,
and we hold that its activities rendered it amenable to process ...
Given the nature and quality of its activities, we hold further that Englebert has purposefully invoked the benefits and protections of the law
of Illinois ... .

The fact that the United States Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, although a somewhat ambiguous act, 66 means in theory that the United States Supreme Court considered any argument for a contrary result to be erroneous.6 7 What is
troubling about that conclusion is the fact that the Supreme Court of
Illinois never focused, even in a conclusory way, upon the knowledge,
intent, or contemplation of the defendant with respect to the indirect
sale of its products in the State of Illinois. It may be overwhelmingly
likely that the defendant did know, contemplate, and perhaps even intend that its tires would be sold to consumers in Illinois, but the law
would be clearer if the court had said so. Adding to the unsettling quality of the opinion is its lengthy quotation from Buckeye Boiler, with all
of its references to foreseeability, which the Supreme Court of Illinois
found "persuasive."' 8 Approximately a month after the apparently
helpful World-Wide Volkswagen opinion, the United States Supreme
Court muddied the waters just a bit by giving its seal of approval to
this unclear ruling of the Supreme Court of Illinois.69 It seems most
65. Id.at ___ 389 N.E.2d at 160 (emphasis supplied).
66. See generally Lewis, Is the Supreme Court CreatingUnknown and Unknowable Law? The Insubstantial Federal Question Dismissal, 5 NOVA L.J. 11 (1980).
67. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332, 344 (1975).
68. 75 Ill. 2d at
, 389 N.E.2d at 160.
69. More consistent with its World-Wide Volkswagen opinion was the action of
the Supreme Court vacating and remanding the opinion of the Colorado Court of Appeal in Byrd v. Butterfield, No. 78-973 (Colo. Ct. App. March 29, 1979), vacated sub
nom. Eschmann Bros., & Walsh, Ltd. v. V. Mueller & Co., - U.S. , 100 S. Ct.
1003 (1980), for further consideration in light of World-Wide Volkswagen. The Colorado court had upheld jurisdiction in a products liability case over a British third-party
defendant who had manufactured a component of a product which found its way into
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unlikely that the United States Supreme Court meant to retreat so
quickly from its forceful statement in World-Wide Volkswagen that
"foreseeability alone" will not suffice.70 Given the Volkswagen opinion,
one is inclined to conclude that the Uniroyal dismissal means that the
requisite purposefulness may be inferred from continuous and systematic commercial activity vis-a-vis the forum state on the part of a nonresident manufacturer of a component of a product shipped into the
state by a third party. I hope that the Uniroyal dismissal means no
more than that, because the distinction between subjective contemplation and objective foreseeability makes perfect sense; sending one's
product into a state for sale is surely purposeful activity vis-i-vis that
state, whereas the foreseeable but unintentional arrival of that product
in the state is not. Curiously enough, the Florida courts do not seem to
have focused upon and fully understood that distinction.
To my knowledge, only two Florida appellate courts have ever addressed themselves to the possibility that "foreseeability" might serve
as a viable basis for personal jurisdiction in a products liability case.
The holdings of these cases are not incorrect, but, in light of WorldWide Volkswagen, their language probably is. The first of these cases,
Aero Mechanical Electronic Craftsman v. Parent,1 was decided by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in 1979. The plaintiff was injured in
Florida by a product which he purchased here from Sears, Roebuck &
Company, part of which had been manufactured by the third-party deColorado; the third-party complaint appears to have contained insufficient allegations
of purposeful activity by the third-party defendant vis-A-vis Colorado, and the court
made some ambiguous references to foreseeability.
More recently, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, for lack of jurisdiction,
from the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Mallory Eng'r, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown
& Assocs., Inc., No. 15530 (Utah March 6, 1980), dismissed sub nom. Valad Elec.
Heating Corp. v. Ted R. Brown & Assocs., Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3420, 3427 (Dec. 9,
1980). The case involved a breach of contract by a New York corporation to supply
goods within the State of Utah. In a clear and persuasive opinion, the Utah court held
that the New York defendant, by contracting to ship goods into Utah and doing so, had
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state.
70.

-

U.S. at

.,

100 S. Ct. at 566. "Summary actions

. . .

should not be

understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved." Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
71. 366 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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fendant Aero in California. Aero's product had gone through the hands
of two other California companies before being sold to Sears, Roebuck
& Company in Chicago. The court approached the question of jurisdiction in the following manner:
In construing § 48.193(l)(O(2), our courts have required a more sub-

stantial contact with Florida than the mere possibility that the product
might reach this state.
We . . interpret the phrase in the ordinary course of commerce [in §
48.193(l)(f)(2)] to mean that the non-resident must at least have some

reason to anticipate that his product will reach another state in the ordinary course of interstate commerce. The manufacturer could then be
said to have acted in a purposeful manner or with such knowledge as to
make its deeds the equivalent of having purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within our state.73

Since the complaint contained no allegatibn that Aero knew or had reason to anticipate that its product would be shipped in interstate commerce when Aero passed it along to another California manufacturer,
the court held that Florida had no jurisdiction over Aero. The holding
is unobjectionable, but "having some reason to anticipate" that one's
product will enter Florida does not constitute purposeful activity in the
state.
At least it can be said in defense of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal that it wrote the opinion in Aero prior to the ruling of the
United States Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen. No similar
excuse is available to the panel of the Third District Court of Appeal
that recently decided Life Laboratories,Inc. v. Valdes.7 The plaintiff
in that case sued the manufacturer of a product, disclosing in her complaint that the defendant manufactured the product for a non-party
wholesaler who distributed it. Since these allegations do not adequately
support a finding of purposeful activity vis-i-vis Florida, the court's remand for dismissal of the complaint is not surprising. What is surprising is the fact that the court cited World-Wide Volkswagen, yet went
on to quote not only the language of Aero set forth above, but some of
72. Id. at 1270 (emphasis in original).
73.

387 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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the "foreseeability" language of Buckeye Boiler as well.7 4 Thus, the
Third District Court of Appeal seemed oblivious to the fact that the
United States Supreme Court had, at the very least, cast serious doubt
upon the "foreseeability" analysis over eight months prior to the district court's action. Florida attorneys relying on the language of Life
Laboratoriesdo so at their peril.
This was the extent of the relevant case law in Florida7 prior to
the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida on January 8, 1981, in
the case of Ford Motor Co. v. Atwood Vacuum Machine Co.76 The
fact pattern in the case closely approximates that of Uniroyal. The
plaintiff sued Ford, alleging that she was injured by the faulty operation of the rear door hinge of a new Ford station wagon. Ford impleaded Atwood, a nonresident corporation which had manufactured
the door hinge assembly. Ford alleged that Atwood supplied door hinge
assemblies to Ford "knowing that they were to be incorporated into
automobiles manufactured by Ford and knew that some of these
automobiles would be shipped to Florida and sold. '77 Significantly,
Atwood did not dispute the factual allegations of the third-party complaint, which therefore had to be regarded as true for the purpose of
the motion to dismiss. The supreme court held that the circuit court
had jurisdiction over Atwood under § 48.193(1)(f)(2).
Justice Boyd, writing for the majority, properly distinguished this
74. Id. at 1011.
75.

It should also be noted that the Supreme Court of Florida approved of the

assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a products liability case on the
basis of very general allegations in Electro Eng'r Prods. Co., Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So. 2d

862 (Fla. 1977). Wrote Justice Hatchett:
Here, the facts stated in the complaint show that petitioners manufactured a
defective paint gun, and were engaged in the business activity of marketing and
distributing this product for use by citizens of this state. These allegations place
them within the reach of the Long Arm statute and satisfy the 'minimum contacts' required by the federal constitution.

Id. at 864 (emphasis supplied). The italicized language connotes purposeful activity in
Florida. Since the allegations were undisputed, the court held that they had to be re-

garded as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss.
76.

1981 Fla. L. Weekly 31 (Jan. 9, 1981), appealdismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3890

(June 1, 1981). Again, the theoretical meaning of a dismissal of an appeal by the
United States Supreme Court is that the Court agreed with the result in the individual
case. See text at footnotes 66-67, supra.

77. Id.
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case from World-Wide Volkswagen, and framed the question for decision this way: "whether a manufacturer who by continuous and systematic activity indirectly through others serves or seeks to serve a state's
market is subject to the jurisdiction of that state's courts." 78 The italicized words are words which arguably connote purposeful conduct.
Justice Boyd then quoted at length the passage from Justice White's
opinion in Volkswagen leading up to its citation of Gray,7 9 finding significance in the implication (which Justice Boyd was willing to draw)
that the United States Supreme Court approved of the Gray opinion.
After quoting at length from Gray itself, he added:
A number of courts have cited the Gray case as authority for the proposition that a manufacturer engaged in interstate commerce, which expects its products to be used in other states, can reasonably expect to be
held subject to the jurisdiction of those other states' courts. 80
Although Justice Boyd made no further mention of the fact, it is
significant that Atwood had not disputed the allegation that it knew
that Ford vehicles containing Atwood's door hinge assemblies would be
sold by Ford in Florida. This knowledge on the part of the nonresident
that it was benefiting from contact with the State of Florida, on a systematic and continuous basis, obviates the need to analyze the jurisdictional question in terms of mere foreseeability, and, in light of Uniroyal, satisfies the "purposeful activity" requirement. While Justice
Boyd largely spoke the language of volitional behavior in his majority
opinion, it is unfortunate that he did not make this argument more
clearly. There is, in fact, some very puzzling language by him toward
the end of the opinion that casts doubt on the cogency of his rationale.
Included is a terribly ambiguous quotation from a 1966 Arizona opinion81 that appears to suggest that even foreseeability may not be required for jurisdiction in a products liability case. This regrettable sentence, apparently intended to have some relevance and significance,
follows:
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 33 (emphasis supplied).
444 U.S. at 297-98, (quoted at 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 33-4).
Id. at 34 (emphasis supplied).
Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966),

(quoted at 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 34).
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Other cases have held that the occurrence of a single injury in the state
is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the nonresident manufacturer's product got there through normal commercial channels, thus
justifying the conclusion that sufficient contacts existed.82
Given such statements, one can almost understand the viewpoint

of Chief Justice Sundberg, joined by Justice England in dissent.
Atwood "carries on no discernable activity in this state," wrote the
Chief Justice. "Its only connections with this state are that it is foreseeable that some of Atwood's components might end up in cars sold by
Ford in Florida, and the indirect economic benefit derived from such
sales."8" The remainder of the dissenting opinion reveals an astute
awareness of the teachings of World-Wide Volkswagen, but one wonders whether anyone stressed the fact that, again, Atwood's commercial
relationship with Florida was not merely foreseeable but known. Had
Ford's pleadings been less helpful, the question would have been
whether an inference of "purposeful activity" might properly be drawn
from the allegation of ongoing commercial activity; in that regard Uniroyal, whose significance may well have been unclear to the Supreme
Court of Florida, would have been relevant." In any event, the result

82. Id. at 34.
83. Id. at 35.
84. Should the Florida courts decide that purposefulness cannot simply be inferred from a continuing course of indirect commercial dealings with the State of Florida, it would probably be necessary for the plaintiff in such a case to make a showing of
the state of mind of the defendant or its agents. Discovery might well be necessary in
order to make such a showing. Florida plaintiffs have utilized discovery with respect to
jurisdictional issues. See, e.g., American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, 359 So. 2d 483
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of the N.Y. Cotton Exch.,
Inc. 276 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Eder Instrument Co. v. Allen, 253
So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); but see Ward v. Gibson, 340 So. 2d 481 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). One district court has held, however, that a trial court could
not require a nonresident defendant to appear in Florida for the purpose of giving testimony concerning jurisdiction. Thomas v. Lane, 348 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1977). The Court in Thomas went on to say that the defendant could not be required
to give a deposition in Florida, but might be required to give one in his state of residence. These conclusions appear to be correct, regardless of the procedural posture of
the case or purpose of the deposition. See Kaufman v. Kaufman, 63 So. 2d 196 (Fla.
1952); Madax Int'l Corp. v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Servs., Inc., 342 So. 2d
1082 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Godshall v. Hessen, 227 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist.
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appears to be correct, and even the dissenters were willing to state
that a nonresident "manufacturer-distributor of the finished product" could be sued in Florida "because of significant business contacts
that a manufacturer-distributor necessarily incurs through his commercial efforts." 85
B. Products Cases Under § 48.181
Perhaps more significant than the apparently occasional tendency
of Florida courts to reach too far under the long arm statutes is the
overly restrictive approach taken by them over the years with respect to
this very same category of cases, i.e., cases in which a.nonresident defendant has sent products into the state. These restrictive cases, however, have arisen under the "business or business venture" long arm
statute, § 48.181. Prior to 1973, it should be remembered, § 48.181
Ct. App. 1969). The question of whether sanctions may be imposed upon a nonresident
defendant who refuses to respond to a discovery request pertaining to jurisdiction has
apparently not been considered by the Florida courts, but has been considered by some
federal courts. The Third, Fourth and Eighth Circuits have answered the question in
the affirmative; the Fifth Circuit has answered in the negative. Aetna Business Credit,
Inc. v. Universal Decor & Interior Design, Inc., 635 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981); Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinea v. Ins. Co. of North America, 49 U.S.L.W. 2801 (June
2, 1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1971).
But see Blanco v. Carigulf Lines, 632 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Wells Fargo
& Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977).
The basic procedure to be followed by the parties when a challenge to jurisdiction
has been raised is described in Electro Eng'r Prods., v. Lewis, 352 So. 2d 862 (Fla.
1977); Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of Ft. Lauderdale, 325 So.
2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Dublin Co. v. Peninsular Supply Co., 309 So. 2d
207 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); and American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Dunzinski, 308
So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Basically, plaintiff must allege in his complaint facts supporting jurisdiction; defendant must then make a prima facie showing,
through affidavits, of the absence of personal jurisdiction, whereupon plaintiff must
substantiate his allegations via affidavits or testimony at a hearing. The case law has
been modified by one of the 1980 amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
adding subpart (i) to Rule 1.070, allowing a plaintiff to plead the basis for service of
process under a long arm statute "in the language of the statute without pleading the
facts supporting service." See generally H. TRAwICK,FLORiDA PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE 121-22 (1980).
85. Ford Motor Co. v. Atwood Vacuum Machine Co., No. 56, 238 (Fla. 1981),
1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 35.
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was the primary long arm statute available with respect to torts, other
than vehicular collisions, committed by nonresidents.
The Supreme Court of Florida held in DeVaney v. Rumsch8" that
the practice of a profession constituted "engaging in business" under §
48.181, and stated: "The determinative question is whether goods,
property or services are dealt with within the state for the pecuniary
benefit of the person providing or otherwise dealing in those goods,
property or services." ' 87 The same court has also made clear that, for §
48.181(1) to apply, the nonresident must have been engaging in a general course of business activity in the state, as opposed to an isolated
act stemming from a pecuniary motive;88 under § 48.181(3), however,
which states in essence that anyone who sells property "through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors" to anyone in Florida shall be
conclusively presumed to be engaging in a business venture here, even a
single in-state sale will suffice.89 Sub-section 48.181(1) has been applied numerous times, in vastly differing fact patterns, and often with
great liberality.90 Oddly enough, however, there have been several cases
in which the direct shipment of products into Florida would seem to
86. 228 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1969).
87. Id. at 906.
88. Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assocs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 561, 564 (Fla.
1975).
89. Id.
90. Among the cases applying § 48.181(1) liberally are Compania Anonima Simantob v. Bank of America Int'l of Fla., 373 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Horace v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Ft. Lauderdale, 251 So. 2d 33 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971); McCarthy v. Little River Bank & Trust Co., 224 So. 2d 338
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Odell v. Signer, 169 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1964); and International Graphics, Inc. v. MTA - Travel Ways, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 598
(S.D. Fla. 1976). The statement in Lake v. Lucayan Beach Hotel Co., 172 So. 2d 260,
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), to the effect that "the mere solicitation of business is not
sufficient" was criticized in Reader's Digest Ass'n v. State ex rel Conner, 251 So. 2d
552 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1971), which held to the contrary; even the Lake opinion
held in favor of jurisdiction, on the basis of little more than "mere solicitation." The
liberal holding of Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody, 421 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970), was
disapproved in Youngblood v. Citrus of the N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). Of particular interest to Florida attorneys is the case of
Atwood v. Calumet Indus., Inc., 308 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), in
which a Florida law firm was able to sue a nonresident client for fees in Florida, because the client had transacted business in Florida through the plaintiff law firm.
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have supported jurisdiction under § 48.181, yet the court apparently
ignored that contact in reaching its conclusion. 91
The restrictiveness of the "product" cases under § 48.181 seems
owing at least in part to the development of the "control" test under
that statute with respect to sales in Florida through "brokers, jobbers,
wholesalers or distributors." The "control" test has been applied by
Florida courts at least since 1962,92 but the Supreme Court of Florida
endorsed it in 1975 in the case of Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc.9 3 The test requires that the nonresident defendant have
"some degree of control" over either (1) the property in the hands of
the brokers, or (2) the brokers themselves." Dinsmore was not a products liability case, but the supreme court applied the "control" test in
such a context later the same year in AB CTC v. Morejon.95 The plaintiff in that case sued the Swedish manufacturer of an allegedly defective washing machine which had caused personal injury to the plaintiff
in Florida. The defendant claimed that all of its products were sold and
shipped in Sweden to its distributor, an independent contractor, which
in turn sent the washing machine to Florida. Since the plaintiff failed
to prove that the defendant exercised any control over the distributor,
or over the washing machine in the hands of the distributor, the plaintiff lost. Given the opinions in World-Wide Volkswagen, Uniroyal, and
Ford,9" it appears that the minimum contacts test would have been satisfied in Morejon as long as the Swedish manufacturer had "deliver[ed] its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
91. Richard Bertram & Co. v. American Marine, Ltd., 258 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Viking Superior Corp. v. W.T. Grant Co., 212 So. 2d 331 (Fla.

1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968); DiGiovanni v. Gittelson, 181 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1965); Forston v. Atlantic Eng'r & Mfg. Corp., 143 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Newark Ladder & Bracket Co. v. Eadie, 125 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.

App. 1961); but see Eder Instrument Co. v. Allen, 253 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1971); Sayet v. Interstate Blood Bank, 245 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.

1971).
92.

Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, 144 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.

1962); Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Brown, 146 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1962).
93.

314 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1975).

94. Id.
95.
96.

324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975).
See text accompanying notes 58-85 supra.
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that they [would] be purchased by consumers in" Florida;97 but the
Florida courts showed no interest in such an inquiry. If the "control"
test is not constitutionally compelled, why the long arm statute should
be so interpreted is unclear, and the Supreme Court of Florida offered
no real explanation for the doctrine in either Dinsmore or Morejon.98
If the "control" test is needlessly restrictive in cases in which products manufactured by a nonresident reach the State of Florida through
intermediaries, it is even less justifiable when the nonresident has
shipped those products directly into the state, whether to an intermediary or to the plaintiff himself. Yet the "control" test was applied to just
such a fact pattern in one of the earliest decisions invoking the doctrine, Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand,9 9 quoted with approval by
the Supreme Court of Florida in Dinsmore.""° A recent case arising
under § 48.181, American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski,101 illustrates
the problem well. The plaintiff in that case was injured in Florida while
wearing a baseball helmet manufactured by the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant sold its products in Florida, through middlemen here, on a general
basis, and that the particular helmet in question had been sold, either
directly or through a distributor, to the Florida supplier of athletic
equipment to the plaintiff's school, which gave it to plaintiff. The defendant claimed, among other things, that it shipped its goods directly
to buyers, in response to purchase orders. Although it appears that the
97. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
567 (1980).

-

U.S.

_,

100 S. Ct. 559,

98. Cases with similar fact patterns in which the "control" test precluded the
exercise of jurisdiction by a Florida court include Cooke-Waite Laboratories, Inc. v.
Napier, 166 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964), and Talcott v. Midnight Pub-

lishing Corp., 427 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1970).
99.

144 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).

100. 314 So. 2d at 565. To the same effect are Mac Millan-Bloedel, Ltd. v. Canada, 391 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct App. 1980); Publications, Inc. v. Brown, 146
So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962); and Jenkins v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,
204 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Fla. 1962). Courts found jurisdiction by virtue of strained
applications of the "control" test in Dublin Co. v. Peninsular Supply Co., 309 So. 2d

207 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), and DiGiovanni v. Gittelson, 181 So. 2d 195 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), both involving goods apparently sent directly into Florida by
the defendant.
101.

359 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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plaintiff alleged in the alternative that the sale had been made through
a distributor, the court found no evidence of such sales, and thus held
that § 48.181(3) was inapplicable. The court then turned to the applicability of § 48.181(1), the general "business or business venture" section, and said this:
The sales to nonresident major sporting goods companies which were
shipped in accordance with the purchaser's directions to sales outlets in
Florida could not constitute the doing of business in Florida because...
those companies were not "brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors"
in this state; and even if they were, neither they nor the102product after it
reached them were under the control of the defendant.
Was the court making the startling statement that, in order to be doing
business under § 48.181, a nonresident seller of goods must be selling
through "brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors"? The court went
on to observe that the defendant did sell some helmets directly to Florida retailers, but concluded:
[D]irect sales by a foreign corporation, not otherwise doing business in
Florida, from a place of business not in this state, to retailers in Florida,
when no control is retained by the foreign corporate seller, does not constitute operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or
business venture in Florida within the meaning and contemplation of §
48.181(1).103
As Judge Ervin said in his reluctant concurrence in American

Baseball Cap,1 ' and as World-Wide Volkswagen suggests, no constitutional concerns would have been raised by the assertion of jurisdiction
over the defendant in this case. Judge Ervin felt, however, that the language of Dinsmore, with respect to the "control" test under §
48.181(1) and (3), compelled the result reached by the appellate court.
In this he may be correct, although, as he noted, Dinsmore is arguably
distinguishable in that it did not involve a general course of business
activity in Florida (so that § 48.181(1) did not apply, without the assistance of § 48.181(3)) and the single "sale" did not occur in Florida (so
102. Id. at 488.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 489-90.
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that § 48.181(3) did not apply). Furthermore, former Chief Justice
Adkins stated in Dinsmore "that the requisite control, as explained
herein, is also applicable to § 48.181(1), where the nonresident is doing
business through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors."105
The court in American Baseball Cap seems to have concluded that the
defendant was not selling through such persons, yet it applied the "control" test anyway. It seems possible, then, for the court to have distinguished the American Baseball Cap case from the apparently controlling precedents, and it is my belief that justice would have been served
by doing so. At least two possible bases for distinction exist: (1) sales
through "wholesalers," etc., versus sales through retailers or directly to
the consumer; and (2) shipment into Florida through intermediaries
versus direct shipment into Florida by the defendant. To draw the second distinction, however, would be to overrule, in effect, the Fawcett
line of cases. 106
It must be noted that what has been said thus far about the American Baseball Cap decision concerns what is technically dictum in the
case. The court declined to fully resolve the "control" issue in the case,
concluding instead that § 48.181 could not apply because there was no
showing that the plaintiff's cause of action arose out of the defendant's
activities in Florida. On this point Judge Ervin disagreed, 10 7 and I can
only add that I find the majority's ruling on this point absolutely
astonishing.10 8
105. 314 So. 2d at 566 (emphasis supplied).
106. See notes 99 & 100 supra.
107. 359 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
108. See also General Tire & Rubber v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 388 So. 2d
264 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Defendant sold its product in Alabama, where it
was incorporated into a product sold in Georgia and then in Florida, where it allegedly
gave rise to personal injuries. There was no evidence of any notice to or knowledge by
the defendant that its product would find its way into Florida, but the court declined to
decide the question of whether the defendant was "doing business" in Florida, concluding instead that the plaintiff's cause of action had not been shown to have arisen out of
the defendant's activities in Florida. This resolution of the case is a bit odd, since the
cause of action certainly did arise out of a connection between the defendant and the
State of Florida, and the real question was whether that connection amounted to "doing business" in Florida within the meaning of § 48.181 or § 48.193. Federal Ins. Co.
v. Michigan Wheel Co., 267 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Fla. 1967), is also questionable in this
regard.
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Although Florida courts have sometimes said that jurisdiction
under the long arm statutes was meant to extend as far as the United
States Constitution permits, 10 9 it is clear that this has not been the case
with respect to actions involving the interstate shipment of goods. Is it
possible for Florida courts to completely shed the restrictive "control"
test that has evolved under § 48.181? A question that immediately
comes to mind is whether the "control" test is also to be applied under
the nearly identical "business or business venture" language of the
newer long arm statute, § 48.193(1)(a). Although a few cases have
indicated that § 48.193(1)(a) is to be interpreted just as § 48.181 has
been, 110 and one case under § 48.193(1)(a) has found the "control" test
satisfied,1" no Florida appellate opinion has yet addressed itself to this
question. The Florida courts should take advantage of the absence of
precedent on this issue and hold that the "control" test was not meant
to be encompassed under § 48.193(l)(a). In doing so, the courts might
seize upon a reason (albeit an unconvincing one) given long ago for the
use of the "control" doctrine;112 namely the idea that a long arm statute (such as § 48.181, through § 48.161) utilizing substituted service of
process should be strictly construed; § 48.193(2) requires personal service of process. 113 They might also note that it would be incongruous
for the courts to stretch to the limits of due process in tort and contract
cases under § 48.193(1)(b), 14 (f),1 and (g), 116 while simultaneously
109. See, e.g., Cleveland Compania Maritima v. Logothetis, 378 So. 2d 1336
(Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fisher v. Premiere Realty Co., Inc., 298 So. 2d 447
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 298 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody, 421 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970); but
see Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of the N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So. 2d 505 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Spencer Boat Co. v. Lieutermoza, 498 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.
1974); Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd., 634 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1981).
110. Bank of Wessington v. Winters Gov't Sec. Corp., 361 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Escambia Treating Co. v. Otto Candies, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1235
(N.D. Fla. 1975).
111. Pace Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Life Carpet & Tile Co., Inc., 365 So. 2d 445
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
112. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, 144 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1962).
113. See text accompanying note 19 supra. Even if my legislative recommendations are accepted, see text accompanying notes 24-27, any method of service allowed
will be a fair one, requiring no "strict construction" of statutes.
114. See Godfrey v. Neumann, 373 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1979).
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doing substantially less under § (1)(a) of the same statute. Admittedly,
the "control" test, even if retained under § (1)(a), will be less significant simply by virtue of the existence, under § 48.193, of general long
arm provisions concerning tort and contract cases. The Aero and Life
Laboratoriescases, discussed above,11 7 demonstrate the courts' lack of
interest in "control" in products liability cases under § 48.193(1)(f)(2),
as does the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in Ford Motor
Company v. Atwood Vacuum Machine Co.118 Understanding that the
"control" test is needlessly restrictive may nevertheless prove to be important with respect to the rare case to which § (1)(b), (f), and (g) do
not apply, but in which personal jurisdiction predicated upon the sale
of goods in Florida may yet be possible under § (1)(a). In addition,
products liability cases can continue to be brought under § 48.181, if
my legislative recommendations do not find favor, by plaintiffs who
prefer the substituted service provisions of § 48.161 (or the provisions
of § 48.081) to the personal service apparently required by § 48.193.
C.

Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction

Quasi in rem jurisdiction, of course, describes the situation in
which a court lacks jurisdiction to render a binding in personam judgment against a nonresident defendant, but does have power over that
nonresident's interests in property located within the state; the result is
that the court may render a judgment against the nonresident which
only affects his interests in that property. Quasi in rem jurisdiction has
clearly existed in Florida. 119 No statute speaks explicitly of the availability of quasi in rem jurisdiction, but it seems to be tied to chapter 49
of the Florida Statutes, which provides for constructive service of pro115.

E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Atwood Vacuum Machine Co., 1981 Fla. L.

Weekly 31 (Jan. 9, 1981).

116. See cases cited at note 52 supra.
117. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra. See also Shelton v. Wisconsin
Motor Corp., 382 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
118. 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 31 (Jan. 9, 1981); see also Electro Eng'r Prods. Co.,

Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1977).
119. See, e.g., Kingswood Builders, Inc. v. Wall Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 317
So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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cess, i.e., service by publication. 120 Since personal and substituted service of process lead to in personam jurisdiction, and there is no general
provision for service by mail, service by publication appears to be the
only method of service available to effectuate quasi in rem jurisdiction
in Florida.12 The publication statute'does require, however, that notice
of the action also be mailed (but not necessarily by certified or registered mail) to any defendant whose address is even partly known. 22
The statute applies, by its clear terms, only to certain enumerated categories of civil actions,1 23 most of which seem to embrace rather obvi-

ously the property-or-status-oriented actions that have traditionally
been associated with in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.
But the present status of quasi in rem jurisdiction is the subject of
considerable doubt, following the rule of the United States Supreme
Court in the 1977 case of Shaffer v. Heitner.124 The decision held that

mere ownership of corporate stock, deemed by the state of incorporation to be located therein, did not suffice to give the courts of that state
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the nonresident owners that
did not arise out of that stock ownership. Writing for six members of
the Court,1 25 Mr. Justice Marshall stated: "We think that the time is
ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice
set forth in InternationalShoe should be held to govern actions in rem
as well as in personam."2

After carefully considering that question,

he wrote: "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court juto the standards set forth in Inrisdiction must be evaluated according
12 7
ternationalShoe and its progeny.1

The most natural inference to draw from this opinion is that quasi
in rem jurisdiction continues to exist, but subject now to the minimum
120. FLA. STAT. § 49.011 et seq. (1979).
121. See, e.g., Ferrer v. Sanchez, 247 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
122. FLA. STAT. § 49.12 (1979).
123. FLA. STAT. § 49.011 (1979).
124. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
125. Mr Justice Brennan, while dissenting as to the application of the minimum
contacts test to the facts of the case, concurred with that part of the majority opinion
which stated that the test should be applied. Id. at 219.
126. Id. at 206.
127. Id. at 212.
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contacts test set forth in InternationalShoe.128 Because, however, the
existence of minimum contacts suffices to give rise to in personam jurisdiction, and to an in personam judgment if the plaintiff prevails, the
concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction, 129 which is more limited, appears
to be completely expendable in light of Shaffer. A given state might
choose to retain the more limited form of jurisdiction, even though the
constitutional requirements for in personam jurisdiction be met, and at
least some of the courts which have continued to recognize quasi in
rem jurisdiction have apparantly done so because no state long arm
statute applied, thus rendering in personam jurisdiction unavailable as
a matter of state law.130 The most rational response to Shaffer by a
state legislature, however, would be to amend the state's long arm statutes to extend in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident whenever
property of the nonresident, located in the forum state, has been
brought within the custody of the court; the minimum contacts test, of
course, would have to be satisfied in each such case. Is it possible, however, that some lesser showing of "minimum contacts" than is needed
for in personam jurisdiction might suffice for quasi in rem jurisdiction?
At least one lower federal court seems to have thought so,'$' but there
128. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
129. At least one federal district court was prepared to conclude that the Court
in Shaffer had "scuttled" quasi in rem jurisdiction. Marketing Showcase, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 445 F. Supp. 755, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Another court stated that Shaffer "has abrogated quasi in rem jurisdiction as a
separate and insular conceptual category." Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451
F. Supp. 1044, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
130. That condition of New York law seems to explain the decision in Intermeat,
Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. D'Angelo, 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); and National Am. Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d
314 (2d Cir. 1979). See also the state cases cited in Leathers, The First Two Years
After Shaffer v. Heitner, 40 LA. L. REv. 907 (1980).
131. Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (footnotes omitted): "[W]e would find on the record now before us that [the defendant] has
had insufficient contacts with the forum to render it personally liable for a judgment of
this Court. Thus, jurisdiction over [the defendant] rests solely upon the attachment."
See also Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630, 633 (D. Conn.
1977): "Finally, even if there are not the minimum contacts needed to satisfy International Shoe (though there may well be), there are surely sufficient contacts to make the
assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction over a foreign corporation fair even under Shaf-
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is not the slightest hint in Shaffer of such a double standard, and, after
all, the reference is already to minimum contacts, i.e., the minimally
requisite contacts compatible with basic fairness.1 32
The primary reason for uncertainty about the present status of
quasi in rem jurisdiction stems from the concurring opinions in Shaffer
by Mr. Justices Powell and Stevens. Mr. Justice Powell said the following, and Mr Justice Stevens said he agreed:' 33
I would explicitly reserve judgment.

. .

on whether the ownership

fer." See also Riesenfeld, Shaffer v. Heitner: Holding, Implications, Forebodings, 30
HASTINGS L. J. 1183, 1204 (1979).
132. Mr. Justice Marshall did suggest, in Shaffer, the possibility that "a state in
which property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property ... as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be maintained
consistently with InternationalShoe." 433 U.S. at 210. At least one federal district
court has followed that suggestion, allowing the attachment in California of an unrelated debt, owed to the nonresident defendant by a California corporation, as security
for a claim being pursued against the defendant in New York. CarolinaPower & Light
Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The court stressed that it was
asserting "jurisdiction merely to order the attachment and not to adjudicate the underlying merits of the controversies." Id. at 1048. See generally Leathers, The First Two
Years After Shaffer v. Heitner, 40 LA. L. REv. 907, 911-12 (1980); Note, Attachment
Jurisdiction After Shaffer v. Heitner, 32 STAN. L. REv. 167 (1979). Whether any
showing of "minimum contacts" is necessary for such an attachment to be constitutional is presently unclear. The Uranex court stated that
where the facts show that the presence of defendant's property within the state is
not merely fortuitous, and that the attaching jurisdiction is not an inconvenient
area for defendant to litigate the limited issues arising from the attachment, assumption of limited jurisdiction to issue the attachment pending litigation in another forum would be constitutionally permissible.
451 F. Supp. at 1048. The Florida legislature may wish to amend the Florida attachment and garnishment statutes, chapters 76 and 77 of the Florida Statutes, to expressly
permit Florida courts to utilize those prejudgment remedies in connection with litigation pending in another state. See FLA. STAT. §§ 76.03, 77.01, 77.031 (1979). Mr.
Justice Marshall also hinted at another possible exception to the Shaffer requirements:
"This case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the question whether the
presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when
no other forum is available to the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at 211 n. 37. This hint was relied
upon in Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977);
see also Amoco Overseas Oil Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation,
605 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979).
133. 433 U.S. at 217.
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of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently
located within a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary
to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of the
value of the property. In the case of real property, in particular, preservation of the common-law concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably
would avoid the uncertainty of the general InternationalShoe standard
without significant cost to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'"

Because Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the Shaffer decision, it
is possible that three Justices would adhere to the traditional concept of
quasi in rem jurisdiction in at least some cases. The fact that no other
Justice joined the concurrences, however, probably indicates that the

other six are strongly in agreement with the sweeping and unequivocal
theoretical pronouncements of the Marshall opinion.'
Only one Florida decision, 3 " to my knowledge, has utilized the
concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction subsequent to the Shaffer decision

in 1977. In addition, at least three other appellate opinions13 since
134. Id.
135. Quasi in rem jurisdiction seems also to have survived in admiralty cases
arising under federal admiralty jurisdiction. Amoco Overseas Oil Corp. v. Compagnie
Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979); Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447
(W.D. Wash. 1978); Engineering Equip. Co. v. S,S, Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706,
(S.D.N.Y 1978).
136. Gelkop v. Gelkop, 384 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), concerned,
among other things, a claim for child support against a nonresident father who was
served by publication. In upholding the judgment against the father but reversing the
order holding him in contempt for failing to pay, the court said this:
It is the prevailing law of this state that a trial court has in rem jurisdiction in a
marriage dissolution action to enter a final judgment or order awarding permanent or temporary alimony, child support, attorneys fees and costs against a respondent who had been properly served, as here, by constructive process ...
The trial court in such action may enforce such provisions of the final judgment
in rem as against any property held by the respondent within the court's jurisdiction; it may not, however, enforce such provisions in personam by contempt proceedings, as here, or by the entry of a money judgment against the respondent.
Id. at 201. The court referred to "in rem jurisdiction," but was clearly describing quasi
in rem jurisdiction. No mention was made of Shaffer or minimum contacts; the decision is therefore erroneous in this respect.
137. Gaskill v. May Bros., Inc., 372 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
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then have made reference to the concept as if it were still viable, and,
indeed, the Florida statutory scheme appears to continue to allow for it,
subject only to the satisfaction of the minimum contacts test. This is
because, according to the Florida courts, service by publication under
chapter 49 cannot provide the basis for a valid in personam judgment; 138 any judgment so obtained, therefore, must be described as in
rem or quasi in rem.
The problem here is twofold. First, quasi in rem jurisdiction in the
absence of minimum contacts is unfair, for all of the reasons set forth
by Mr. Justice Marshall in Shaffer, and is conceptually unnecessary if
minimum contacts are present. Regardless of the present constitutional
status of the concept, then, quasi in rem jurisdiction should no longer
be recognized under Florida law. Second, the use of service by publication upon a nonresident whose address or location is known is indefensible, regardless of the theoretical basis for jurisdiction. 13 9 The United
States Supreme Court indicated long ago that constructive service is
acceptable even as a predicate for in personam jurisdiction in the case
of defendants whose whereabouts are unknown,1 40 and it is to that cateBoeykens v. Slocum, 356 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Palmer v. Palmer,
353 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Of these three, only Gaskill referred
explicitly to quasi in rem jurisdiction; the ohers referred to "in rem jurisdiction," but
clearly meant quasi in rem.
138. Palmer v. Palmer, 353 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
139. "The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by
publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known
or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected
by the proceedings in question." Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13
(1962), referring to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318
(1950). Accord, Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956). Both
Schroeder and Walker were actions involving real property, and might have been described as in rem or quasi in rem proceedings. In any event, it is clear that the defendant's "legally protected interests" are at stake in such proceedings. See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
140. This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a
customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably
possible or practicable to give more adequate warning. Thus it has been
recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of
an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the
situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.
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gory of cases that constructive service should be confined. 141 Even if the
best possible notice is not constitutionally required, as in a "true" in
rem proceeding (e.g., dissolution of marriage), it should be required by
statute. Again, service by registered or certified mail should be available and satisfactory, as should personal service, with respect to every
form of long arm jurisdiction, but the simple mailing provided for by
§ 49.12 is not satisfactory.
Because I am recommending the repeal of § 49.011, which lists
the categories of cases in which service by publication is permitted, it
may be desirable to add some of these categories to the general long
arm statute, § 48.193(1). Many disputes traditionally adjudicated on
the basis of quasi in rem jurisdiction should fall within the scope of
§ 48.193(1)(c), providing for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
with respect to claims arising from his ownership, use, or possession of
real property in Florida. If, for example, it is not clear that § (1)(c)
would apply to disputes over ownership of real property in Florida, the
statute should be amended.1 42 Similarly, § 48.193 presently makes no
reference to personal property in Florida, or to dissolution of marriage.
A provision should also be enacted conferring jurisdiction upon the
Florida courts to enforce the valid judgments of the federal courts and
courts of other states; Mr. Justice Marshall suggested in Shaffer that
such jurisdiction is permissible under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 43 but such actions in Florida presently appear to be encompassed within § 49.011(1), (7), (8), or (11), and thus may be tied to

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950), citing Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912) which upheld service by publication where the
defendant could not be located.
141. Risman v. Whittaker, 326 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976), permitted service by publication upon nonresident defendants whose addresses were
known, despite the fact that personal service was concededly possible under §§ 48.193
and .194. Although service by publication gave rise only to "in rem jurisdiction," the
ruling is a regrettable one. Other cases have held that service by publication is permissible only when personal service cannot be effected. Taylor v. Lopez, 358 So. 2d 69
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Bradbery v. Frank L. Savage, Inc., 190 So. 2d 183 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
142. "[W]hen claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State
where the property is located not to have jurisdiction." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 207 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
143. Id. at 210, n.36.
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service by publication.
III. CONCLUSION

The present configuration of long arm statutes in Florida is needlessly duplicative and complex, the unfortunate product, like so much
in this state, of unplanned growth. There is no justification for the present connection between particular long arm statutes and particular
methods of service of process. Substituted service of process upon the
secretary of state, moreover, is an archaic procedure that should be
abolished. Constructive service, by publication, should be confined to
those cases in which the defendant, resident or nonresident, cannot be
located. The Florida legislature should consider whether any of the
long arm statutes other than § 48.193 confers on the Florida courts
jurisdiction not conferred by § 48.193 to an extent such that the statute
should be retained; if so, the statute should be amended to provide that
service of process may be accomplished in any manner provided for by
§ 48.194. That section should be amended to encompass all permissible
methods of service, any of which may be utilized in connection with
any long arm statute.
The Florida courts should regard quasi in rem jurisdiction as a
thing of the past. At the same time, they should extend in personam
jurisdiction under the long arm statutes to the furthest extent permitted
by the federal constitution, confining if not abrogating the "control"
test under § 48.181 (if that section is not repealed) and drawing a clear
distinction, in products liability cases, between "purposeful activity"
and mere "foreseeability." The courts should also recognize, finally,
that the existence of "minimum contacts" may depend, in a given case,
upon the connection between plaintiff's cause of action and defendant's
contact with the state, and that no theory of "consent" stemming from
the enforced appointment of an agent can lead to a contrary
conclusion.
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